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Data-Driven Mergers under EU Competition Law  
 
Anca D Chirita 
This chapter aims to review data-driven mergers including, but not limited to, major 
conglomerates involving large scale of individual user data, known as ‘big data’, by Facebook 
(WhatsApp), Microsoft (Yahoo!, Skype and LinkedIn), Google (Double Click), TomTom (Tele 
Atlas), Publicis/Omnicon, Telefonica/Vodafone UK, and so on. These mergers have been 
unconditionally cleared based on the traditional law and economic analysis of mergers, known as 
a ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ legal test. The test disregards public policy 
concerns, including the economics of privacy, i.e., data analytics; data sharing with third parties, 
e.g., publishers or retailers; and data selling. The chapter draws on previous research on the rise 
of big data and the loss of privacy, which sheds light inter alia on the ineffectiveness of the data, 
consumer and competition rules and on the intrusive privacy policies of the various digital 
platforms.  
This chapter argues that the current assessment of mergers has to activate the public policy 
clause and to consider the economic implications of privacy following a merger. No merger 
should be unconditionally cleared if it involves a large amount of users’ data.  
The chapter arrives at the conclusion that the new data protection framework is insufficiently 
robust. The contract theory of informed consent associated with the potential of sharing 
anonymised and/or aggregated data means that digital platforms are able to exploit data 
protection loopholes and abuse users’ trust in digital platforms. In addition, the chapter looks at 
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the treatment of innovative digital platforms from the perspective of Schumpeterian economics 
and therefore identifies the fallacy of too great a reliance on ephemeral market shares. It 
discusses more critically the expectation of a robust and coherent theory of harm to consumers 
in the context of digital markets.  
I. Institutional Cooperation: a Pragmatic Solution in the Age of Big-Data Mergers? 
In the digital age, the technological advance has contributed to a myriad of mega-mergers. In the 
last decade, the European Commission reviewed a number of large scale acquisitions ranging 
from $3.1 billion paid by Google to acquire DoubleClick in 2008; €2.9 billion paid by TomTom to 
acquire Tele Atlas in 2008; $45 billion paid by Microsoft for Yahoo! Search in 2010, $8.5 billion for 
Skype in 2011 and $26 billion for LinkedIn in 2017; and $19 billion paid by Facebook to acquire 
WhatsApp in 2014 and $35 billion for the collapsed merger between Publicis and Omnicom.1 What 
all these mergers had in common was a vast amount of users’ data available on digital platforms, 
known as ‘big data’.  
Such acquisitions might well have been driven by the desire to invest existing profits and 
encourage even more innovation. Retrospectively, it is questionable whether any of the much 
smaller entities acquired by these giants have become more successful innovative entities.  
However, the acquisition of less successful businesses cannot remain unchallenged by the hidden 
value of big data. Indeed, we have witnessed the emergence of highly innovative technologies 
based on intelligent business solutions where platform users pay nothing in return for the use of 
a service. Nonetheless, such users pay with their own data. Should ownership of an online 
platform change, then the new owner will take over large amounts of data. This process shifts 
the focus from an interest in pure innovation to an interest in data, as the latter possesses an 
intrinsic monetary value. Even if it is not sold at an internet-based auction, such data is valuable 
for sharing.  
How, then, was it possible that these large transactions went ahead without attracting any 
attention? The first data protection act was a directive in 1995 and, following suggestions from 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), it was not until 2012 that, at the European 
Commission’s initiative, this area of law became the subject of a major reform spanning over five 
years.2 The EDPS’s Opinion in 2016 further informed the wider debate by reference to a triangle 
                                       
1 See, e.g., COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008; COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 
February 2010; COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011; COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 
January 2017; COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014. 
2 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, the European Data Protection Directive on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data; European Data 
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among data, consumer protection, and anti-trust enforcement, with a specific focus on mergers.3 
By recognising that cyber space is a threat to privacy, personal data and the very basic principle 
of non-discrimination, the EDPS united these three areas of law through the legal requirement of 
fairness, i.e., fair processing of data versus fair competition to consumers (B2C) and protection 
against unfair competition (B2B).  
In digital markets, it is often the case that anti-competitive practices will infringe two or more 
applicable legal frameworks. It is therefore expected that consumer, data and competition 
authorities should work together towards establishing forms of mutual and practical cooperation 
during investigations. But this problem is not resolved so simply. As is often the case, 
cooperation can cause delays. Furthermore, too-large a chain of responsible actors might also 
lead to an ineffective solution. Instead, a more pragmatic approach to big data is for the 
European Commission to activate its public policy clause whenever this is really needed. The 
answer to this last question will be offered in the final section. 
II. Data-Driven Mergers – A Few Preliminary Observations 
Recent years have witnessed a number of high profile merger cases in high-technology markets: 
the sole acquisition by Microsoft of Skype, a provider of internet-based communications services 
and software; the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, active as providers of text, photo, voice 
                                                                                                                       
Protection Supervisor’s Opinion on European Commission’s Communication ‘A Comprehensive Approach 
to Personal Data Protection in the EU’, 22 June 2011; the European Commission’s proposal to strengthen 
online privacy rights and the digital economy, 25 January 2012; European Data Protection Supervisor’s 
Opinion on EC data protection reform package, 7 March 2012; The Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion on 
data protection reform proposal, 23 March 2012; WP 29 update on data protection reform, 5 October 2012; 
the EU Parliament adopted the General Data Protection Regulation on 12 March 2014 with overwhelming 
support in its favour; European Data Protection Supervisor’s recommendations on the final text of the 
GDPR, 27 July 2015; the European Parliament, European Commission and Council reach an agreement on 
the GDPR on 15 December 2015; Article 29 Working Party’s action plan for the implementation of the GDPR, 
2 February 2016; and finally, on 27 April 2016 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data is adopted, which 
entered into force on 25 May 2018, as well as Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and on the free movement of such data; on 10 January 2017, the European Commission proposed 
two new regulations on privacy and electronic communications (ePrivacy) and on the data protection rules 
applicable to EU institutions (Regulation 45/2001) that align the existing rules to the GDPR; Data Protection 
Directive for the police and justice sectors into national legislation on 6 May 2018; Proposal for a Regulation 
on the protection of personal data in EU institutions on 22 May 2018. 
3 See the European Data Protection Supervisor’s Executive Summary of the Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on effective enforcement in a digital society economy, OJ C 463/09 [2016], 
highlighting how cyber space represents a threat to privacy, personal data and the principle of non-
discrimination as ‘antitrust has its roots in political decisions to disrupt abusive monopoly power for the 
benefit of society at large. Consumer rights emerged as a bulwark against abusive traders. Big Data 
opportunities for boosting productivity and connectivity should be accompanied by Big Data Protection 
safeguards’. 
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and video message apps for smartphones; the acquisition of Tele Atlas, a producer of navigable 
digital map databases by TomTom, the largest supplier of portable navigation services in Europe; 
the merger between Publicis, a French international communications and advertising group and 
Omnicom, a US-based global advertising, marketing and corporate communications company; 
the acquisition of LinkedIn, which is active in the provision of sales intelligence solutions, by 
Microsoft, the latter being active, inter alia, in the provision of software solutions for customer 
relationship management; the acquisition by Telefonica UK, Vodafone UK and Everything 
Everywhere of a joint venture, JV, offering various mobile commerce (‘mCommerce’) services to 
businesses in the UK as a ‘Wallet’ platform; the joint venture involving Sanofi, a global 
pharmaceutical group, Google and JV, offering services for the management and treatment of 
diabetes; and the acquisition of Cegedim by IMS, both of which are active in the information 
technology sector, offering solutions to measure and improve the performance of companies 
active in the healthcare sector. 
The effects of the above data-driven mergers have come to be felt and understood by not only 
competition scholars, but also practitioners.4 In her recent speech, the Commissioner for 
Competition, Mrs Vestager, explained: ‘People understand that handing over data has a cost. 
Because each time we share our data, we give up something very valuable. Something that could 
be used against us’.5 Hopefully, the vast array of data from the above mergers will not come back 
to haunt us, the users of online platforms and other digital services. Five years ago, her 
predecessor mentioned that ‘traditionally, the storage and treatment of personal data has been 
the province of laws and regulations designed to protect the privacy of citizens’; indeed, Mr 
Almunia was right that ‘this will remain of paramount importance in the foreseeable future’, as 
has recently been proven by the study of big data analytics.6 
                                       
4 Nonetheless, there is scant literature on the subject, which is largely attributed to notoriously lengthy 
merger decisions. For further references by practitioners, see P Werner, S Clerckk and H de la Barre, 
‘Commission Expansionism in EU Merger Control – Fact and Fiction’, (2018) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 9 (3), 139-141; G Lougher and S Kalmanowicz, ‘ EU Competition Law in the 
Sharing Economy’, (2016) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 7 (2), 92-93; 99-101; for a case-
by-case brief review, see, M Kadar and M Bogdan, ‘Big Data and EU Merger Control – A Case Review’, 
(2017) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, p. 1-9; B Holles de Peyer, ‘EU Merger Control and 
Big Data’, (2017) Journal of Competition Law & Economics (4) 13, p. 767-791, with a focus on so-called 
‘theories of harm’ but arguing against the review of privacy considerations in mergers. 
5 See EU Commission, Commissioner for Competition, Speech: ‘When technology serves people’, 1 June 
2018, Budapest, p.2. 
6 See, e.g., EU Commission, Commissioner for Competition, Mr J Almunia, Speech: ‘Competition and 
personal data protection’, Brussels, 26 November 2012. Although the Commission did not define a market 
for personal data, the Commissioner considered that this was not something that should be ruled out 
altogether. The Google/Double Click merger, however, involved a combination of personal data about 
search and web browsing behaviour, but was, unfortunately, not considered as such. 
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(a) Free Product or Service in Return for Data 
First, it is helpful to illustrate the relevance of data in the context of free products or services. In 
the area of mergers, the decision in Publicis/Omnicom offers an excellent definition of ‘big data’ 
analytics. Its primary goal is to help ‘companies make better business decisions by enabling data 
scientists and other users to analyse large volumes of transaction data as well as other data 
sources that may not be assessed by conventional business intelligence programmes’.7 Data and 
its analytics are the ‘raw’ material and a ‘tool’ used by advertising agencies to create advertising 
messages and deliver them to consumers.8 In essence, one can simply say that the study of data 
analytics is effectively examining the means to implement and achieve marketing strategies and 
targeted advertising, which is normally captured by consumer law. 
Subsequently, this decision also makes an extremely important distinction among three different 
kinds of services offering marketing information, market research and media measurement.9 The 
first consists in the provision of data to individual consumers for direct marketing purposes, 
which is tantamount to targeted advertising. The second consists of measuring actual purchasing 
patterns through retail tracking or data obtained from consumer panels. The last one refers to 
measuring the audience of specific media, such as television and the Internet. 
One of the most important instances of gradual recognition in data-driven mergers is the free 
offering of a product or service which can be monetised through other means. For example, in 
Facebook/WhatsApp, Microsoft/LinkedIn and Microsoft/Yahoo, consumer communications apps, 
social and professional networking services, and internet search services are all recognised as 
being provided ‘free of charge’ or free from ‘monetary charges’ but they could, nonetheless, be 
‘monetised’ through other means, including advertising or charges for premium services.10 In 
Microsoft/Skype, it was mentioned that it is difficult to monetise consumer communications, as 
                                       
7 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 617. 
8 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 622. 
9 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 618. 
10 See, e.g., COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 31 and 47; COMP M. 8124, 
Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 87; COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, 
para 33. 
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competitors offer them free of charge, and an estimated 75% of Skype users would even give up 
Skype rather than pay for its use.11 The General Court stated on appeal that ‘the fact that the 
services are offered free of charge is a relevant factor in assessing the market power of the new 
entity. (…) any attempt to make users pay would run the risk of reducing the attractiveness of 
those services and of encouraging switching’.12 In Facebook/WhatsApp, it was noted that ‘users of 
consumer communications apps tend to be very price-sensitive and expect communications apps 
to be provided for free’.13 A contrasting example of monetisation is Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica 
UK, which acknowledges that the mobile market in the UK is ‘more and more data centric, 
customer demand for data is increasing and all operators seek to monetise this trend’ and that 
data has become ‘an important competitive criterion’.14 Very close to a similar recognition of data 
analytics services is Publicis/Omnicom where the merging parties have marketing data analytics 
capabilities which were used in house for targeted advertising.15 In other words, the parties claim 
that their analysis of consumer data is ‘an intrinsic part’ of their own service. 
In Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere/JV,  the most significant inquiry is into the relevant 
market for data analytics services in order to collect and analyse mobile usage data from the 
merging parties and advertising services and to provide customers with ‘valuable insights into 
consumer behaviour’.16 Business analytics of this kind include prospective analytics with a view to 
increasing the customer base, cross-selling and loyalty analytics.17 The Commission recalled that, 
in WPP/TMS, it had previously identified a separate market for research services and media 
measurement services aimed at measuring and understanding consumer attitudes and 
purchasing behaviour and the market for marketing information services in VNU/ACNielsen.18 The 
latter referred to the supply of personal and/or sensitive data, such as address, age, social group, 
activities, habits of consumption etc., which could be used for direct marketing purposes. Due to 
                                       
11 COMP M.6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, paras 86 and 76. 
12 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 73. 
13 COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 90. 
14 COMP/M.7612, Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, 11 May 2016, paras 435 and 517 respectively. At para 794, 
there is a further reference to another mobile operator, O2’s plans to make data sharing between mobile 
devices and people ‘easier than ever before’. Later, at para 1076, Virgin Media and TalkTalk are mentioned 
as ‘ideally placed to offload a proportion of their mobile customers’ data traffic onto their fixed networks 
in a cost efficient manner’. These examples show how internet companies are also capable of harvesting 
big data. 
15 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, paras 11 and 619. 
16 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 191. 
17 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 192 and 
193. 
18 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 197; 
COMP/M. 5232, WPP/TMS, 23 September 2004, para 13; COMP/M. 2291, VNU/ACNielsen, 12 February 2001, 
paras 10 to 12. 
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the rather ambiguous responses received, the Commission left it open whether there should be a 
separate market for online and mobile data analytics.19 
However, from the area of abuse of a dominant position, the recent decision in the Google 
Comparison Shopping case highlighted that the fact that a product or service is offered free of 
charge does not prevent such an offering from being considered an economic activity.20 This is an 
evolutionary recognition of data as the new currency in digital markets. 
It is difficult but not impossible to examine a degradation of quality. As advanced elsewhere, the 
focus can be shifted from the price variation to small but significant and non-transitory changes 
in quality (SSNIQ).21 Another excellent point raised by Gal and Rubinfeld is that ‘we should not 
automatically exempt free goods from antitrust scrutiny’.22 Ultimately, there is no ‘free’ product. 
As one commentator observed:  
‘We do not pay money for Google’s services. But someone pays for its thousands of engineers, 
and that someone is advertisers. (…) We also pay in our ignorance of how the company operates 
(…), and how it uses the data it collects’.23 
(b) Dual-sided platforms 
The second important recognition in the above merger decisions is that such services are offered 
through the medium of ‘two-’ or ‘multi-sided’ platforms.24 As in traditional transactions, such 
dual-sided platforms might offer one service for free, but extract revenues from the other side of 
                                       
19 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 202 and 
203. 
20 See EU Commission, COMP Case AT. 39740, Google Search (Shopping) decision, 27 June 2017, published 
on 18 December 2017, para 152; citing the General Court rulings in Microsoft and Cisco & Messagenet, see GC, 
Case T-201/04, Microsoft, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras 966-970, and GC, Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems and 
Messagenet v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, paras 65-74. 
21 See, e.g., M Gal and D Rubinfeld, ‘The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust 
Enforcement’. (2016) Antitrust Law Journal (80) 3, 540.  
22 See, e.g., M Gal and D Rubinfeld, ‘The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust 
Enforcement’. (2016) Antitrust Law Journal (80) 3, 542; this is because ‘a free good does not imply a lack of 
adverse welfare effects’. The authors suggested the use of a presumption of legality for free goods, with 
the burden of proof on those arguing otherwise. In practice, this would imply that competition authorities 
would need to produce evidence of consumer harm inflicted by free goods. 
23 See, e.g., F Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 66. 
24 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 47; COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, 
para 87: LinkedIn offers a multi-sided platform, which enables users ‘to connect, share, discover and 
communicate with each other across multiple devices and means’; COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 
March 2008, para 290; COMP M. 4523, Travelport/Worldspan, 21 August 2007, where the Commission 
defined the two-sided market for Global Distribution Systems which operates as a wider platform between 
upstream travel providers, such as airports, hotels and car rentals, and downstream intermediary agents. 
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the same platform.25 The economic designation of these online platforms is circular, as the 
transaction itself is still a bilateral contract rather than the unilateral stipulation of a free gift. 
Therefore, in spite of the convoluted terminology, online platforms continue to operate legally 
under the same assumption of a traditional contract of sale. In this scenario, in return for a free 
service, users then offer their own experience data. Third parties, i.e., advertisers or retailers, 
may even secretly offer monetary considerations to have access to such data.  
The cause of multi-sidedness is, of course, data which accounts for monetary consideration. This 
is not surprising, as digital payments have nowadays resulted in the lapse of money in favour of 
more innovative technologies where use of cards has overtaken the use of money in exchange 
for goods. So why not have data in return for service offerings? Whilst the driver of such 
platforms is inevitably an exploration of new avenues for attracting users to the mouse trap of a 
free service, the transactional exchange of data has de facto become the new currency operating 
in digital markets. In the area of abuse of a dominant position, it has more recently been 
recognised in the Google Comparison Shopping case that ‘offering a service free of charge can be 
an advantageous commercial strategy, in particular for two-sided platforms’.26 
‘Even though users do not pay a monetary consideration for the use of general search services, 
they contribute to the monetisation of the service by providing data with each query’.27 This 
paragraph effectively recognises competition that is not based on price, as there are other 
parameters of competition.28 In the same spirit, the Director-General for Competition, Mr 
Laitenberger, declared: ‘Now in many digital markets, price – as we used to understand it – plays 
no decisive role since the services are not monetised on the consumer side, or at least there is no 
                                       
25 On the benefits of dual-sided online platforms, see AD Chirita, ‘Google’s Anti-Competitive and Unfair 
Practices in Digital Leisure Markets’  (2015) 11 (1) Competition Law Review, p. 113 and the general literature 
referred to in footnote 33. 
26 EU Commission, COMP Case AT. 39740, Google Search (Shopping) decision, 27 June 2017, published on 18 
December 2017, para 159. 
27 EU Commission, COMP Case AT. 39740, Google Search (Shopping) decision, 27 June 2017, published on 18 
December 2017, para 158. 
28 EU Commission, COMP Case AT. 39740, Google Search (Shopping) decision, 27 June 2017, published on 18 
December 2017, para 160: ‘even though general search services do not compete on price, there are other 
parameters of competition between general search services’, which include the relevance of results, the 
speed with which results are provided, the attractiveness of the user interface and the depth of indexing 
the web. 
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price expressed in monetary terms’.29  Data protection has therefore been recognised as ‘an 
important parameter of competition’ on the basis of quality.30  
To sum up, cyber space is driven by online platforms which know how to monetize, monopolise 
and control their users’ online experiences and behaviour.31 
(c) To Define, or Not to Define the Relevant Markets: That Is the Question but What Are the 
Practical Implications? 
In the overwhelming majority of the merger decisions under review, the Commission has been 
rather Kaplowian32, as it has repeatedly ruled that ‘the exact market definition’ can be ‘left 
open’.33 A sensible explanation provided in Kaplow’s scholarship is that the process of defining 
markets ‘entails unnecessary work’ and the outcomes are ‘inferior to those arising when it is 
eschewed entirely’.34 
The Commission, however, spent considerable energy in analysing each potentially narrower 
relevant market. In Facebook/WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn, for example, it questioned 
whether social networking services and consumer communications apps could be further divided 
accorded to their intended use.35 On the basis of functionality and the availability on operating 
systems and on different platforms, consumer communications apps can indeed be divided 
                                       
29 EU Commission, Director-General for Competition, Johannes Laitenberger, Speech: EU competition law 
in innovation and digital markets: fairness and the consumer welfare perspective, Brussels, 10 October 
2017, p. 6. 
30 EU Commission, Director-General for Competition, Johannes Laitenberger, Speech: EU competition law 
in innovation and digital markets: fairness and the consumer welfare perspective, Brussels, 10 October 
2017, p. 9; ‘we see data protection as an element of the quality of the product’, p. 10. 
31 In the same vein, see, e.g., CJ Hoofnagle, Federal Trade Commission Privacy Law and Policy, chapter 6 on 
‘Online privacy’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 146. 
32 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, ‘Why (Ever) Define Markets?’, (201) Harvard Law Rev 124, 438-517, suggesting that 
‘it is difficult to render coherent the process of inferring market power from market shares in redefined 
markets’. 
33 See, e.g., COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 33; COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! 
Search, 18 February 2010, para 81; COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para 43; COMP M. 8124, 
Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 87. 
34 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, ‘Market Definition’ in Roger D Blair and D Daniel Sokol (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), vol. 1, 350; in 
support of Kaplow’s assertion, see, e.g., Mark A Lemley and Mark P McKenna, ‘Is Pepsi Really a Substitute 
for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP’ in Roger D Blair and D Daniel Sokol (eds) The Cambridge 
Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 195; on the 
pitfalls of too narrow or too wide market definitions, see, e.g., AD Chirita, ‘Editorial: Competition and 
Regulatory Trends in Digital Markets’, (2017) Competition Law Review 12 (2), p. 122. 
35 See, e.g., COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 60, where Facebook offers a richer 
experience compared to WhatsApp, which offers a ‘more personal and targeted’ one; COMP M. 8124, 
Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 95 and 97; there is an increasingly overlapping pattern where 
similar services initially targeting individuals have expanded to reach out to professionals; see para 89; 
COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 87; COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 
February 2010, para 33. 
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further. WhatsApp was offered only on smartphones, but not on tablets and PCs.36 In 
Microsoft/Yahoo Search!, the Commission questioned an eventual distinction between search and 
non-search advertising and whether, beyond advertising, intermediation via software vendors, 
internet search providers and distribution agreements, with hardware manufacturers on entry 
points to search engines, are relevant markets.37 Similarly, in Microsoft/Skype, the Commission 
questioned a further division of the market for consumer communications on the basis of its 
functionalities (IM, voice or video calls); operating systems (Windows, Mac, Linux, Android etc.); 
and platforms (PCs, smartphones and tablets).38 It recognised that there was a market for 
enterprise communications.39 Narrowly defined markets for the provision of online advertising 
space, intermediation in online advertising and the provision of ad serving for display ads was yet 
another useful recognition in Google/DoubleClick.40 For the latter market, the Commission 
contemplated a further subdivision between the provision of such services to advertisers and 
publishers.41 It considered, however, that there was no need to identify even narrower markets 
for the provision of search and non-search advertising space or further subdivisions of 
intermediation.42 
However, in Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission was not yet prepared to recognise separate 
markets for the ‘provision of data or data analytics services’.43 Similarly, in Publicis/Omnicom, the 
Commission considered that there was no need to further narrow down the sales side of the 
‘media buying services’ market into large- and small-scale advertisers or on the basis of the type 
of media, sector or size of account.44 As previously, the Commission considered that the ‘exact 
scope of the relevant product market can be left open’; this is because the merger did not raise 
serious doubts regarding any possible market definition.45 
In TomTom/Tele Atlas, the Commission examined the relevant upstream market for the provision 
of digital map databases and the intermediation software market.46 The latter uses an algorithm 
                                       
36 COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 18. 
37 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, paras 75 and 87. 
38 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, paras 29, 42 and 55. It did so also for the market for 
enterprise communications services, questioning whether this particular market needs to be further 
narrowed on the basis of operating systems.  
39 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para 187. 
40 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 56, 68 and 81 respectively. 
41 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 81. 
42 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 56 and 73 respectively. 
43 See, e.g., COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 72. 
44 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, paras 27, 70, 75, 79 and 80. 
45 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 92. This was because the combined market share 
of the merging parties was below 15%, see, para 142. 
46 See, e.g., COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, paras 38 and 45. A digital map will normally 
include relevant data, such as street names, addresses, driving directions, turn restrictions and speed limits; 
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to calculate routes, including offering voice guidance.47 TomTom is active in two downstream 
markets for the provision of navigation software and as a manufacturer of portable navigation 
devices.48 Companies active in these markets use the same input. Although the Commission 
contemplated, again, narrowing down the relevant market for navigable digital map databases 
according to the type of navigation device, e.g., Personal Digital Assistant, GPS-enabled mobile 
telephone and ‘in-dash’ navigation device, it ultimately chose not to do so.49 It left open the exact 
delineation of the relevant product markets, as this did not affect the proposed merger.50 
In Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, the Commission defined a single market for retail mobile 
telecommunications services to end customers, but did not divide it further by type of service, 
e.g., voice, data or SMS; by type of network technology, i.e., 2G, 3G and 4G; or by end-user.51 It 
considered it inappropriate to narrow down separate markets for voice services, SMS/MMS 
services and data services,52 which could have considered the implications of data usage and 
traffic. Similarly, in Telefonica/Vodafone, the Commission examined a fast-growing sector of 
mobile Commerce, ‘mCommerce’, including mobile payments, advertising and, most importantly, 
data analytics.53 It identified the relevant market for the wholesale supply of mobile wallet 
platforms, but ‘left open’ whether a market for secure storage also includes secure storage on 
devices attached to the handset or cloud-based solutions, or whether the market for online 
advertising should be narrowed down further to search and non-search services.54  
                                                                                                                       
see para 17. Digital maps are sold to manufacturers of navigation devices for address location, route 
planning and navigation; see para 19. There are on-board, off-board and hybrid navigation software 
systems; see para 46. The Commission considered that it was inappropriate to identify separate markets 
depending on the type of navigation device in which the software is used; see para 51. 
47 More specifically on algorithmic consumers, as systems likely to collect, record and aggregate immense 
volumes of personal data; see, e.g., M Gal and N Elkin-Koren, ‘Algorithmic Consumers’, (2017) Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 30 (2), p. 324. 
48 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 14. This vertical merger is a case of upstream 
market integration where a producer acquires its main provider of an important input. 
49 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, paras 28 and 29. There was, however, a limited 
substitutability of navigable digital map databases, see para 32, as the ‘greater the geographic coverage of 
map data and content, the higher the licence fee’ that had to be paid, see, para 31. 
50 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 38, i.e., whether or not individual country or 
regional licences constitute separate product markets. 
51 See, e.g., COMP/M.7612, Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, 11 May 2016, paras 251, 255 and 259. This was 
because all providers offer all these kinds of services to end-customers. At para 265, it was noted, however, 
that in the UK, competition in the mobile market is increasingly ‘data-centric’, i.e., based on sale of data 
packages. The latter cover Internet data usage and traffic as part of a monthly data allowance. 
52 COMP/M.7612, Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, 11 May 2016, para 262. 
53 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 26 and 88. 
54 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 102, 110 
and 151 respectively. 
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The narrowest relevant market could be the market for mobile contactless or off-line payments.55 
Leaving these aside, JV would be acting as an intermediary for the one-stop-shop sale of digital 
advertising, including ‘push’ and ‘intelligent bulk’ SMS’, ‘pull offers’, display advertising, coupons 
and vouchers.56 With regard to ‘non-intelligent’ bulk SMSs, the respondents submitted to the 
Commission that these are part of generic advertising and therefore not interchangeable with 
targeted advertising.57 In contrast, the merging parties submitted that targeted advertising 
should be treated similarly to display advertising in order to reach out to their desired consumer 
audience.58  
Due to the technical and commercial features of mobile advertising, e.g., the size of ads and the 
possibility of advertising outlets near the location of a smartphone holder, the Commission 
considered the existence of a sub-market for mobile search advertising; thus, this was also ‘left 
open’.59 However, the majority of the respondents to the Commission’s survey submitted that, 
within mobile advertising, targeted marketing messaging should be considered as a separate 
market from search and non-search advertising.60 The two markets were not substitutable due to 
existing differences in marketing scope and reach, campaign objectives, advertising functions, 
pricing models, targeting possibilities, consumer data collection and consumer behaviour.61 
In 2012, the recognition of such a market would have been significant, as the tracking technology 
would have clearly been able to exploit the personal location data of mobile subscribers. As 
described in this merger decision, the conduct would have involved targeted advertising only, 
rather than the sharing of location data with retailers, more specifically, for achieving online price 
discrimination. However, one could also argue that targeted advertising on the basis of location 
                                       
55 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 123. 
56 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 140 to 142; 
however, JV would not be acting for the supply of intermediation services for search advertising. 
57 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 189 and 
190. Therefore, retail bulk SMS services constituted a separate market from active marketing messaging. 
58 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 146. 
59 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 152 and 
159. 
60 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 160. This is 
because the two services were seen as complementary, not substitutable. 
61 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 161. For the 
characteristics of ‘mobile push advertising’, see para 168, namely, being highly targeted to users, able to 
elicit an immediate customer response, to allow the advertisers to accurately measure the campaign 
success and consumer engagement and very attractive to users as offers are clipped to the wallet and can 
be redeemed simultaneously with the payment. 
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tracking is only a first necessary step towards the implementation of behavioural price 
discrimination.62 
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, the software solution offered by Microsoft helps companies to manage 
customer interactions from sales, marketing or customer databases. It is involved in the 
collection of data sets so as to boost sales or improve data quality.63 LinkedIn offers sales 
intelligence solutions to professionals interested in personal data, financial information or 
contacts metrics in order to reach out to potential customers.64 To its premium members, 
LinkedIn offers a Sales Navigator solution, which uses its users’ database to identify sales 
opportunities. Here, the Commission identified another relevant market for the provision of 
intelligence sales solutions.65 However, it did not narrow down the market for social networking 
platforms based on their intended use, i.e., personal and professional-centric social networks, 
due to an overlap of functionalities.66 
In Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, the newly created joint venture offered several services using an 
integrated digital e-medicine platform developed by Google for the system delivery and 
monitoring of insulin and glucose for the management and treatment of diabetes as well as data 
analytics services.67 The exact scope of the market definition was initially left open, but later 
focused on data collection, display, storage, analysis and transmission related to the 
management and treatment of diabetes.68 The Commission referred to its previous examinations 
of data analytics, outside the healthcare sector, where it was appropriate to differentiate 
between marketing information, market research and media measurement services.69 Some of 
the respondents submitted to the Commission that the algorithms and tools used to analyse 
healthcare data are comparable to those used for the analysis of other types of data.70 However, 
                                       
62 For earlier arguments on these issues and, more specifically, on targeted advertising and online price 
discrimination, see, e.g., AD Chirita, ‘The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy’, in M Bakhoum, B Gallego 
Conde, MO Mackenordt and G Surblyte (eds) Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and IP Law 
– Towards a Holistic Approach? (Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, forthcoming 2018), p. 11-17; specifically on 
behavioural price discrimination, see, A Ezrachi and M Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of 
the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 112-143. 
63 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 31. 
64 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 57. 
65 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 68. 
66 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 97 and 98. Respondents to the Commission’s 
survey suggested that the creation and updating of a detailed resume or CV is an essential functionality of 
this platform, see para 101. 
67 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, paras 6 and 17. 
68 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, paras 37, 38 and 42. 
69 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 17. 
70 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 46. 
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the joint venture did not raise competition concerns, regardless of whether there is a separate 
product market for algorithms for analysing healthcare data.71 
In IMS Health/Cegedim Business, the Commission examined healthcare professional databases; 
sales tracking data; data for the provision of real world evidence, i.e., observational studies, data 
collected on actual patient experiences and use of a product in clinical trials; and the primary 
market research services.72 Business intelligent solutions included tracking technologies and data 
analytics, including aggregation, matching, consolidation and verification.73 Again, the exact 
delineation of the markets for the provision of healthcare professional databases and for sales 
tracking data was left open.74 The Commission did not narrow down the market for the provision 
of business intelligence solutions,75 though the latter could have looked at the functionality of 
the software for reporting and analysis or for advanced analytics, including data mining and 
statistics.76 
Thus, one could reach a preliminary conclusion. The implications of offering ‘open’ rather than 
closed market definitions is adding to a nebulous understanding of online platforms, as these are 
actively involved in a variety of tiny markets; some of the latter are engaged in the study of big 
data analytics. 
(d) Is a Quick Look at the Market Shares Self-Revealing or Self-Defeating? 
In the market for consumer communications, there were only two close competitors: WhatsApp, 
with a 20-30% share of this market, and Facebook Messenger, with 10-20%, alongside Skype, with 
5-10% and Twitter, with 5-10%.77 Following the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, Facebook could have 
strengthened its position in the market for social networking services by adding users and/or 
functionalities.78 This aspect was, however, mitigated by the fact that around 70-90% of 
WhatsApp’s users were already active on Facebook, too.79  
                                       
71 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 48; in fact, the parties considered it 
inappropriate to narrow down the market for data analytics and argued instead that health data is subject 
to special regulation, see, para 45. 
72 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, paras 9-24, 26, 49. 
73 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, paras 40-41. 
74 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, paras 73 and 80. 
75 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 105. 
76 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 99. 
77 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 84 and 94. 
78 COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 159. Another example where the merging 
parties were close competitors is COMP/M.7612, Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, 11 May 2016, para 417. 
79 COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 159 and 162. 
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In the worldwide market for the provision of navigable digital map databases within the 
European Economic Area, Tele Atlas was the largest duopoly player.80 Similarly, in 
Publicis/Omnicom, the merger was likely to lead to a duopoly in certain national ‘media buying 
marketing’ markets.81 
DoubleClick and 24/7 Real Media/OpenAdStream on the one hand, and DoubleClick and 
aQuantitative Atlas on the other, enjoyed 40-50% and 35% shares of the market respectively, while 
Microsoft enjoyed a just below 5% market share of the marketing segment.82 In the UK, the retail 
market for mobile telecommunications services was found to be ‘very concentrated’ in 
Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, being dominated by four players with over 90% of all 
subscriptions and revenues.83 
Looking at the revenues from advertising, in 2006, Google possessed an approximately 20—40% 
share of online advertising worldwide, whilst Microsoft’s Dynamic 365 solution was fourth after 
Oracle’s Adaptive Intelligent Apps by Data Cloud.84 In terms of usage, Facebook Messenger 
attracted around 100-200 million users in the European Economic Area compared to 50-150 
million users of WhatsApp.  
Google was clearly dominant in the area of universal search with 90-100% compared to Microsoft 
with 20-30% and Yahoo Search with 10-20% in the EU, including shares below 5-10% in 2009. 
LinkedIn’s Sales Navigator relies on a database of around 430 million users and could, therefore, 
become an ‘important input’.85 Microsoft’s Windows Live Messenger had an approximately 90-
100% market share, with Skype having 70-80% on PCs in 2011, Microsoft’s WLM having around 30-
40%, and Skype’s video calls having 40-50%. This showed that both Microsoft and Skype were 
close competitors. Having attracted 600 million users, WhatsApp was definitely more popular 
than Facebook Messenger in 2014 compared to the latter with 250-350 million.86 
The philosophy underpinning the Commission’s interpretation of market shares is that in the fast-
growing high-technology sector ‘high market shares are not particularly indicative of competitive 
                                       
80 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 80. 
81 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 631. This will enable the merging parties to 
impose conditions on media vendors and to attract more advertisers, to the competitive disadvantage of 
smaller rivals. 
82 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 268. Given that this is a highly innovative 
business model, what should matter most is the potential to exploit the relevant data rather than the 
market share coverage. 
83 COMP/M.7612, Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK, 11 May 2016, para 411. 
84 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 198 and 200. Oracle’s app offered access to 
over 5 billion global consumer profiles and 400 million Business-to-Business profiles. Adobe’s analytics is 
also active in marketing, being second most competitive in terms of price. 
85 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 203 and 246 respectively. 
86 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 128. 
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strength’.87 These figures are not self-defeating but must, nonetheless, be seen in the context of 
dynamic competition based on innovation. Therefore, in Microsoft/Skype and 
Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission repeatedly stated the same underlying assumption, 
namely, that ‘the consumer communications sector is a recent and fast-growing sector which is 
characterised by short innovation cycles in which large market shares may turn out to be 
ephemeral’.88 Furthermore, following the appeal in Cisco & Messagenet, the same contextual 
consideration of dynamic competition prevails in Facebook/WhatsApp, in that 
‘the very high market shares and very high degree of concentration on the narrow market, to 
which the Commission referred merely as a basis for its analysis, are not necessarily indicative of 
market power.’89  
The only difference is a subsequent reference to the above context as enabling ‘the new entity to 
significantly impede effective competition’ in Cisco & Messagenet and to ‘lasting damage to 
competition’ in Facebook/WhatsApp respectively. 
Finally, one could say that looking at market shares is a bit delusional given the particular context 
of high technology markets, but the temporal dimension is more helpful in correcting such 
misperceptions. 
(e) Were Alternatives Available? 
This is a straightforward question in the merger decisions under consideration, but it is 
dependent on how narrow the relevant markets had previously been defined. In four of these 
mergers, namely, FacebookWhatsApp, Microsoft/LinkedIn, Microsoft/Yahoo!Search and 
Google/DoubleClick, a good number of available alternatives to both merging parties were found 
as follows: to Facebook, e.g., Google+, LinkedIn, MySpace, Pinterest, InterNations,90 and 
WhatsApp, e.g., iMessage (Apple), BBM (Blackberry), ChatON (Samsung), Hangouts (Google), 
Android, and Skype (Microsoft);91 to LinkedIn, there are a number of alternatives available that 
are specialised in ‘social networking services’, e.g., Xing, Viadeo, GoldenLine, Academia, Behance, 
Doximity,92 and Microsoft, e.g., LinkedIn’s Sales Navigator (Avention), Data.com, Dun & 
                                       
87 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011; on appeal, see, Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v 
Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 51. 
88 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 65; COMP/M. 
7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 99. 
89 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 74. 
90 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 49. 
91 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 85. 
92 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 90; as enterprise social networks facilitating 
communication among employees, see, Facebook’s Workplace, para 93; on available alternatives, see, 
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Bradstreet, InsideView, and Twitter;93 to Yahoo, e.g., Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Ask, Yandex, 
AOL, Baidu and, obviously, to Microsoft; to DoubleClick, e.g., Google’s AdSense, Yahoo! Publisher 
Network, Drive PM, Trade Double, Zanox, AdLink, Interactive Media, and AOL etc.; and to Google, 
e.g., Yahoo! and Microsoft for search advertising.94 Alternative competitors to Publicis/Omnicom’s 
data analytics space included measurement and analytics providers, such as Omiture (Adobe), 
Google Analytics, Coremetrics (IBM), webtrends, comScore, Nielsen, Flurry, Marketshare, 
Neuralitic, Agent, Localytics and Tracksimple (Bluekai); Independent providers such as Turn, 
Invite Media (Google), Efficient Frontier (Adobe), The Trade Desk, MediaMath, DataXu and 
Accordant Media; and other ad agencies, such as WPP, IPG, Havas, Dentsu-Aegis, MDC Partners 
and iCrossing.95 
It was solely in Microsoft/Skype that the merging parties were indeed close competitors; this was 
despite there being a number of alternatives, e.g., Microsoft’s Windows Live Messenger, Skype, 
Google, Apple, Facebook, Yahoo! and AOL and Microsoft enterprise comms, Cisco, Citrix, IMB 
and Skype.96 By contrast, Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp were found not to be close 
competitors on the basis of several indicia including, inter alia, the identifiers used to access the 
services, i.e., phone number for WhatsApp; the source of the contacts, i.e., users’ address book 
for WhatsApp; user experience, which was richer for Facebook; the privacy policy on data 
collection for advertising and sharing; and the usage frequency.97 
(f) Barriers to Entry and Switching Costs 
As has rightfully been argued elsewhere,98 the most important barriers to data collection, sharing 
and transferring are, of course, data protection and privacy laws.   
In Facebook/WhatsApp and Microsoft/Skype, there were very low and low barriers to entry 
respectively.99 Although there were no legal barriers to entry, such as patents, know-how and 
IPRs, in Facebook/WhatsApp, there were additional issues such as portability and 
                                                                                                                       
paras 108 and 109; respondents indicated that it would be difficult to transform a personal social platform 
into a professional one, para 110. 
93 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 225. 
94 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014; COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017; 
COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010; COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 
2008. 
95 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 622. 
96 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011. 
97 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 93, 102 and 107. 
98 For the view that data protection and privacy laws create legal barriers to the collection of data, see, 
e.g., D Rubinfeld & M Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’, (2017) Arizona Law Review 59: 339, p. 360; thus, 
this can be circumvented through anonymisation. The authors noted that, although paternalistic, privacy-
based limitations of data collection protect the public interest, see p. 361. 
99 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 94; COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 
2011, para 77. 
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interoperability.100 Switching was therefore problematic, as users, then, could lose all of their 
data and interaction history; thus, the messaging history remained accessible on smartphones.101 
There was, however, evidence of consumer switching in Germany.102 Data portability was 
‘unlikely to result in a lock-in of users who typically retain access to message history on their 
handset even if they start using another consumer communications app’.103 
In TomTom/Tele Atlas, customers had to reconfigure the new database when switching suppliers 
of navigable digital map databases. The Commission identified that barriers to switching were 
relatively limited to the reconfiguration cost, including that of modifying production tools to 
handle different data formats.104 Elsewhere, however, it was recognised that, in the event of 
switching, a producer of digital map databases would have to spend substantial resources to 
collect any additional data necessary for navigation.105 
In Microsoft/Skype, switching costs were higher if the users were charged for the service after a 
long time, but there were no technical or economic constraints. 106 In contrast, in Microsoft/Yahoo 
Search!, barriers to entry were very high; for example, $1 billion needed to be invested in 
hardware and human resources respectively.107 It was also found that advertisers would no 
longer switch from adCenter to Panama.108 Switching between ad serving suppliers also entailed 
additional costs in Google/Double Click, e.g., staff training and deployment. Although some of 
such costs could be significant, they are still ‘manageable’.109  
Ultimately, in Publicis/Omnicom, it was ‘very easy’ or ‘somewhat easy’ for advertisers to switch 
with no significant costs other than the cost of re-tendering.110 As the market for marketing 
communications services is a ‘highly fragmented and creativity-driven’ market, barriers to entry 
                                       
100 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 120 and 122 respectively. 
101 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 113. 
102 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 174. 
103 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 137; in addition, it was noted that users of 
consumer communications apps cannot be locked-in to any particular physical network or hardware 
solution; neither Facebook Messenger nor WhatsApp are pre-installed on a large base of datasets; and 
there is no ‘status quo bias’ potentially affecting consumer choice. 
104 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/TeleAtlas, 14 May 2008, paras 106 and 99 respectively. However, the costs of 
handling different database formats are not significant, see, para 102. 
105 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/TeleAtlas, 14 May 2008, para 25. This is more so since compiling and processing 
the necessary data is ‘a very time-consuming process’, see, para 26, because vast volumes of data have to 
be collected from various sources, and field survey teams have to drive down every road in the EEA and 
record all features on the way, see para 132. 
106 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para 77; on appeal, see Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet 
SpA v Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 80. 
107 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 111. 
108 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 181. 
109 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 137, 297 and 329. 
110 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, paras 227, 233 and 614. 
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are low, and termination of contracts is easy without incurring significant costs.111 In addition, 
large advertising networks, including WPP, IPG, Dentsu-Aegis and Havas, will probably exert a 
significant competitive constraint on the merged entity.112 
g) Network Effects 
In Facebook/WhatsApp, the existence of network effects was ‘unlikely to shield the merged entity 
from competition from new and existing consumer communications apps’.113 
 
III. Post-Merger Innovation Incentives: Dead or Alive? 
In the digital markets under scrutiny, one sensitive issue has been whether the merged entity will 
continue to invest in innovation. In Facebook/WhatsApp, the underlying assumption was that 
customers could easily switch to competing services if the merged entity were to reduce the 
amount of innovation.114 Being recognised as ‘recent and fast-growing’, the consumer 
communications sector was portrayed as characterised by ‘frequent market entry and short 
innovation cycles in which large market shares turn out to be ephemeral’.115 However, as recent 
events have shown, digital giants like Facebook could lose their market share due to reputational 
damage following data breaches rather than to their innovation cycles. The latter are also 
referred to in Microsoft/Skype under the same assumption that, in these markets, innovation 
cycles are short-lived.116 As both software and platforms are constantly redeveloped, innovators 
lead the market solely for a short while.117  
In both Microsoft/LinkedIn and Microsoft/Yahoo Search!, there is recognition that the former 
entity, i.e., Microsoft, could make it more difficult for alternative intelligent solutions ‘to compete 
and bring innovation in the market’, whilst the latter, i.e., Yahoo, would require heavy 
investments in upgrading data, storage for a web search index and advanced algorithms.118 There 
is a potential contradiction as, although Yahoo was recognised as a ‘weak innovative force’ that 
                                       
111 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 598. See, also, para 603, where respondents 
identified creativity as a key factor on the basis of which marketing communications service agencies are 
selected by customers alongside expertise, quality, delivery, price scale and absence of conflicts of interest. 
112 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 602. 
113 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 135. 
114 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 94. 
115 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 99. A Schumpeterian understanding of 
innovation cautions against the risks for competition authorities when assessing innovation incentives ex 
ante, which is also pervasive in the area of merger control; see,e.g., AD Chirita, ‘Editorial: Competition and 
Regulatory Trends in Digital Markets’ (2017) Competition Law Review 12 (2), p. 126. 
116 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para 83. 
117 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para 83. 
118 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 246; COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 
February 2010, para 140. 
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‘may lose the ability to provide important innovations’, Yahoo’s incentives to innovate would not 
be reduced, as Google would have similar incentives.119 The same conclusion was valid for 
Microsoft, in that it would be unlikely to reduce its incentives to innovate.120 It was assumed that 
the new platform (Microsoft/Yahoo Search!) could compete more effectively with Google.121 
Prospectively, these predictions have proved to be inaccurate. The post-merger reality is often a 
different one in which not all conglomerates become successful innovators. Retrospectively, one 
could question whether Yahoo/Search or LinkedIn are better services than before, in particular 
whether significant achievements based on innovation could also be highlighted.  
IV. From Fictional Assumptions Disregarding Data to the Growing Relevance of Data 
Prospectively, one could challenge such assumptions, which are known in mergers as 
‘counterfactual’ scenarios. In Google/DoubleClick, there were a number of competitive 
advantages for Google following the integration of DoubleClick’s ad serving technology with ad 
intermediation services, Double Click’s customer base among publishers and advertisers, and 
data about consumer behaviour collected through ad serving.122 This was a first indicator of the 
role of data. Furthermore, DoubleClick represented a ‘key input into distribution channels that 
compete with Google’s AdSense’; however, the combination of users’ databases was thought 
unlikely to provide ‘a considerable additional competitive advantage’.123 A portability issue 
became apparent as advertisers had to transfer ‘past’ data from one system to another.124 It was, 
however, estimated that less than 1% of former customers would require the migration of 
historical delivery data upon switching. 
Another aspect that was neglected in Google/Double Click was the data collected by Double/Click, 
which contained information about a rich sub-set of the web-browsing behaviour of Double/Click 
users across all publishers’ websites engaged in targeted advertising.125 The latter had the 
potential to inflict consumer harm given that publishers are normally either paid or at least 
sponsored by businesses, including retailers. For example, tracking technologies could facilitate 
                                       
119 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, paras 141, 203, 206 and 219. 
120 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 275. 
121 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 192. 
122 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 225. 
123 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 286 and 298. In contrast, the US FTC concluded 
that ‘neither the data available to Google, nor the data available to DoubleClick, constitute an essential 
input to a successful online advertising product’, see, P Jones Harbour, FTC, file no. 071-0170, Dissenting 
Statement in the Matter of Google/Double Click, 2007, p. 12. 
124 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 140. 
125 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 182. 
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online price discrimination on the basis of such targeted advertising.126 Double Click’s justification 
was that, although it had indeed collected behavioural data from its users, such data was used 
for a legitimate purpose only, namely, improving DoubleClick’s service experience offered to 
advertisers.127 Furthermore, the record of ads containing the ‘prices paid by different ad 
networks’ was in the form of aggregated data.128 This could have partially met the data protection 
requirements.  
Nonetheless, the variation in pricing could have been investigated further, in particular regarding 
whether tracking technologies were used to monitor users and whether the latter had 
meaningfully consented to this procedure. Rather, increasing the confusion, there is another 
specific reference to the fact that DoubleClick could not possibly have made the data in question 
available to ‘others’, presumably third-parties, publishers or advertisers, subject to a contractual 
express prohibition that was unlikely to be changed in the future.129 This seemingly indicated that 
there was an inner circle of publishers and advertisers with which DoubleClick must have had a 
contractual relationship in return for an adequate consideration of their business interests. The 
argument based on confidentiality grounds is particularly weak. In this respect, DoubleClick 
argued that the relevant data would have been of limited use anyway. This was because of the 
confidentiality clauses included in the contractual arrangements with both advertisers and 
publishers.130  
The Google/Double Click merger decision includes nevertheless a significant disclaimer at 
paragraph 360: 
‘it is not excluded that (…) the merged entity would be able to combine DoubleClick’s and 
Google’s data collections, e.g., users’ IP addresses, cookies IDs, connection times to correctly 
match records from both databases. Such combination could result in individual users’ search 
histories being linked to the same users’ past surfing behaviour on the internet (…) the merged 
entity may know that the same user has searched for terms A, B and C and visited pages X, Y and 
Z in the past week. Such information could potentially be used to better target ads to users’.131 
                                       
126 For a suggestion that the ability to price discriminate on the basis of consumer preferences may be 
‘substantial’, see, e.g., D Rubinfeld & M Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’, (2017) Arizona Law Review 59, 
339, p. 378. The final conclusion, however, goes to the opposite direction by suggesting that the ‘collection 
and analysis of big data has undoubtedly increased social welfare’, see p. 381. 
127 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 183 and 184. 
128 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 187. 
129 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 188, 257 and 265. 
130 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 277. 
131 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 360. 
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There is no better evidence elsewhere that the merged entity could only consolidate its previous 
accumulation of data, which would make the tracking of users’ locations easier.  
All in all, in 2008, it was simply too early for data experts to be articulate about the monetisation 
of data, which justifies the above positive assumption about the lack of a competitive advantage 
based on data. It will be argued that the exclusionary focus based on access to data, or an ability 
to accumulate it, is a fallacy. What matters most is how data, once accumulated, is used to exploit 
online consumers. 
However, many years later, in Facebook/WhatsApp, a closer examination of the data collected by 
the merging parties revealed that, on the one hand, Facebook collects data for the purpose of 
serving its users more targeted advertisements; Facebook also claimed that it does not sell or 
provide data analytics to advertisers or third parties.132 On the other hand, WhatsApp claimed 
that neither does it sell advertising, or store or collect users’ data for advertising purposes, and 
nor does WhatsApp collect its users’ personal data, i.e., verified name; sensitive data, i.e., age, 
gender; and any other personally identifiable data including social groups, activities, consumer 
habits or other characteristics that are valuable for advertising purposes.133 Based on WhatsApp’s 
disclosure, it would appear that this platform offered its users enhanced privacy protection. This 
was, however, not so, as in 2012, WhatsApp was investigated by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada and the Dutch Data Protection Authority for having forced its users to 
give access to their entire address book without consent.134 Apart from this, WhatsApp’s privacy 
policy of 2012 is self-explanatory, as WhatsApp claimed that it did not collect its users’ mobile 
address book, but actually, the company collected its users’ mobile phone numbers. It also 
claimed not to collect location data or to target its users with advertisements.135 Indeed, the 
policy clearly mentioned that WhatsApp does not ‘sell or share your Personally Identifiable 
Information (such as mobile phone number) with other third-party companies for their 
commercial or marketing use without your consent or except as part of a specific programme or 
feature’ for which users had the ability to opt-in or opt-out.  
                                       
132 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 70.  
133 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 71 and 166. 
134 See L Clark, ‘WhatsApp breached data privacy laws by storing non-user contact details’, Wired, 29 
January 2013, available at http://www.wired.co.uk/article/whatsapp-privacy; last accessed June 2018; for 
the findings of the international investigation by the Canadian and Dutch data protection authorities, see, 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Final Report of the Findings: Investigation into the personal 
information handling practices of WhatsApp Inc.,  15 January 2013, available at 
https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/downloads/rapporten/rap_2013-whatsapp-opc-
final-report-of-findings.pdf. 
135 See, e.g., WhatsApp’s archived privacy policy of July 2012, available at 
https://www.whatsapp.com/legal?doc=privacy-policy&version=20120707, subject to several notable 
safeguards concerning the security of the data and the opt-in and opt-out available procedures. 
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Ultimately, the objective justifications for data collection and sharing by WhatsApp are in line 
with those of similar platforms including, for example, the performance, improvement and 
maintenance of WhatsApp’s own service or as part of a legal requirement, such as a court order, 
subpoena, search warrant or other equivalent. Another similar procedural safeguard put in place 
referred to the event of a merger, where 
‘in the event that WhatsApp is acquired by or merged with a third party entity, we reserve the 
right to transfer or assign the information we have collected from our users as part of such 
merger, acquisition, sale, or other change of control’.136 
The above disclaimer is technically a procedural waiver for WhatsApp’s previous data collection, 
which was intended to facilitate the transfer of data. However, such a procedural notice is given 
too early for its users to express any meaningful and informed consent, and personal data could 
simply be purchased from elsewhere, i.e., other third-parties.137 Furthermore, such users had no 
realistic choice of blocking the merger anyway. The material scope of application of the data 
protection regime is confined to data breaches, not to merger reviews. 
Facebook’s submission was, however, in sharp contrast to Facebook’s own privacy policy, which 
mentioned that it collects behavioural data, including its users’ location, which Facebook shares 
not only with companies that are part of Facebook, but also with integrated third-party apps, 
websites or other services, including third-party advertisers.138 Facebook sought consent only for 
sharing personally identifiable users’ data with ‘third party advertisers and analytics partners’, 
but not for aggregated data sent to vendors, service providers and partners. Given Facebook’s 
business model of offering a social networking platform free of charge, the revenues were 
extracted from advertising so that targeted advertising represented Facebook’s default terms 
and conditions of trade. Indeed, Facebook did not consider asking its users for consent to use 
targeted advertising. Obviously, this model did not comply with the data protection regime, as 
whilst general advertising is annoying, targeted advertising must have exploited Facebook users’ 
behavioural data. Also, the reference to advertisers as business partners is used interchangeably 
with vendors, which could include retailers or any other interested business parties.  
                                       
136 See also WhatsApp’s archived privacy policy of July 2012. 
137 For the view that the ‘notice-and-choice’ frameworks are deeply undermined by the ‘third-party 
problem’, see, CJ Hoofnagle, Federal Trade Commission Privacy Law and Policy, chapter 6 on ‘Online 
privacy’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 146. 
138 See, e.g., AD Chirita, ‘The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy’, in M Bakhoum, B Gallego Conde, MO 
Mackenordt and G Surblyte (eds) Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and IP Law – Towards a 
Holistic Approach? (Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, forthcoming 2018), p. 17. 
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Most notably, Facebook also claimed that it would be ‘unable to automatically and reliably 
associate a Facebook ID with a valid phone number used by a user on WhatsApp’ and that 
technical integration of the two services was unlikely.139 Nonetheless, in August 2016, WhatsApp 
updated its privacy policy to allow for linking WhatsApp users’ phone numbers with Facebook 
users’ identity in a move which was intended to ‘improve customer experience’. The previous 
statement was proven to have been misleading and the Commission sent its statement of 
objections.140  Due to such misleading statements, the Commission did not investigate the market 
for the provision of data or data analytics services.141 
In Publicis/Omnicom, the merging parties made an astonishing revelation: first, that they did not 
control the primary source of data and, second, that they needed clients’ databases and needed 
‘to purchase such data from various first-party data sources’.142 The revelation should be 
persuasive for commentators who still question whether there is a dark rather than an open 
market for the sale of data. The Commission concluded that navigable digital map databases are 
‘important inputs’ for device manufacturers and providers of navigation software.143  
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, providers of competing software solutions claimed that LinkedIn’s Sales 
Navigator could represent an ‘important input’; furthermore, Microsoft could make it more 
difficult for alternative intelligent solutions ‘to compete and bring innovation’ into the market 
following this merger.144 The LinkedIn Sales Navigator could potentially share users’ datasets with 
third parties.145 Again, this consideration was ignored because the sharing of personal data would 
undermine LinkedIn’s own business model. 
For example, in Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere/JV, JV would send targeted marketing 
messages solely to mobile subscribers who had opted-in to receive them.146 This would then be 
fully compliant with the data protection framework. Yet, had such subscribers not understood 
the hidden pitfalls of the terms and conditions of privacy, their consent might not have been 
meaningful. In addition, JV would aggregate behavioural data in the market for retail bulk SMSs, 
                                       
139 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 138 and 139. 
140 See, e.g., European Commission, COMP/M. 8228, Facebook/WhatsApp, press release of 20 December 
2016, ‘Mergers: Commission alleges Facebook provided misleading information about WhatsApp takeover’. 
As a result, €110 million fine was imposed on Facebook for providing misleading information about the 
WhatsApp merger. 
141 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 72. 
142 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 624. 
143 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 165; thus, most providers considered navigable 
digital map databases as a ‘key input’ for navigation software, see, para 164. 
144 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 246. 
145 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 247 and 248. 
146 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 26 and 
88. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199912 
26 
 
with the assistance of computer software for originating messages, including routing SMS to any 
destination.147 This would, however, require a significant investment in software and systems and 
the analysis of vast amounts of data.148 The Commission considered it unlikely that the merging 
parties would discriminate between the bulk of SMSs sent by JV and those sent by 
competitors.149 
It was put forward that JV’s data analytics would involve the analysis of data on customers and 
their behaviour. JV would collect data from its mobile wallet platform and its advertising 
intermediation services so as to provide customers with valuable insight into consumer 
behaviour.150 However, JV would not offer standalone data analytics. The personal and/or 
sensitive data including inter alia age, residential status, profession, and location would be 
anonymised, which will then meet the data protection requirements.151 Some respondents were 
concerned that JV would develop a database that would become an essential input for targeted 
mobile advertising.152 The merging parties mentioned competition from a range of data analytics 
providers, such as Google Analytics, Apple, Facebook, Visa, MasterCard, Experian, Acxiom, 
Amazon or eBay.153 All of them possess sophisticated databases used for targeted advertising. 
Another concern was whether JV could foreclose competing providers of data analytics or 
advertising services by combining personal, location, response, social behaviour and browsing 
data. In other words, could JV create a unique database that would become an essential input for 
targeted mobile advertising that no other provider would be able to duplicate?154 This was not 
the case, as the above data sets were already available to Google, Apple, Facebook, card issuers, 
reference agencies or retailers.155 For example, Microsoft submitted that it can provide the ‘same 
level of granularity’ with regard to geo-location data.156  
In conclusion, JV would be able to collect a vast array of consumer data for its mobile data 
analytics and advertising services.157 As there are ‘strong and established’ competing players, JV 
                                       
147 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 493 and 
494. 
148 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 511. 
149 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 514. 
150 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 531. 
151 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 532. 
152 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 534. 
153 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 535. In the 
UK, the market for data analytics and market research is worth £2.8 billion per year, see, para 536. 
154 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 539. 
155 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 543. 
156 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 545. In 
addition, social behavioural data could be collected from Facebook or LinkedIn, see, para 547; browsing 
data from Google, cookies or Apple iPhone. 
157 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 557. 
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could not possibly foreclose competition in the respective markets for mobile data analytics, 
market research and marketing information services.158 
On a positive note, in IMS Health/Cegedim Business, IMS provides pharmaceutical companies with 
sales data on the basis of a predefined geographical segmentation without any identification of 
sales to individual pharmacies or customers, as is required by data protection law.159  
V.  The Corporatist Model of Data Control – Where Terms and Conditions of Privacy are Imposed 
on Consumers: Is Huge Accumulation of Data a ‘Road to Serfdom’?160 
In recent years, privacy has been the focus of the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the right 
to privacy, who noted that: 
‘There are strong indicators that Privacy has become an important commercial consideration 
with some major vendors adopting it as a selling point. If there is a market for privacy, market 
forces will provide for that market’. 161 
Corporations do not need to accumulate a vast amount of data to make online platforms work. 
Although everyone accepts it, the objective necessity justification for the accumulation of data is 
implausible. It can be argued, for example, that Google’s maps app cannot work if location 
tracking is disabled; however, many other services do not need to use tracking technologies 
other than for their own commercial interests. In the vast majority of cases, corporations allow 
the disclosure of data in order for them to respond to legal proceedings. But there is no objective 
justification for exploiting behavioural data for the targeted advertising of users in exchange for 
a monetary consideration from advertisers or publishers.  
Who, then, dictates the corporatist model of data control?162 Users have no other realistic choice 
but to agree to exploitative terms and conditions of privacy where data is the new currency. 
Beyond corporations, whose sole interest is boosting corporate profits from advertising, the 
                                       
158 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 558. The 
same conclusion is subsequently found in the market for advertising services, see, para 579. 
159 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 20. 
160 Generally, on the paradigmatic shift from capitalism to socialism and totalitarianism, see, FA von Hayek, 
The Road to Serfdom (London, Routledge, 2001), originally published in 1944. 
161 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, United Nations’ 
Human Rights Council, doc. no. A/HRC/31/64 of 8 March 2016. 
162 A first answer is that states can and do engage in massive surveillance, see, e.g., Judge M Bohlander, 
‘The Global Panopticon: Mass Surveillance and Data Privacy Intrusion as a Crime against Humanity’, in M 
Böse, M Bohlander, A Klip and O Lagodny (eds) Justice Without Borders: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang 
Schomburg (Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2018), p. 84. A second answer is that individuals can also influence 
the model by rejecting a lower privacy standard, which is, after all, a subjective preference. For the view 
that both quality and privacy are subjective preferences, see, e.g., K Waehrer and B White, ‘Online services 
and the analysis of competitive merger effects in privacy protections and other quality dimensions’, (2016), 
available on SSRN.  
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state, too, has an interest in having such corporations disclose relevant data for legitimate legal 
proceedings. Thus, creating a disclosure mechanism of data puts a strain on the balance of 
legitimacy between proper functioning or service maintenance and judicial or administrative 
expectations.  
The state ultimately empowers corporations by enacting insufficiently robust legislation without 
proper coordination with other areas that might be affected by the accumulation of data. So the 
initial question in the title might not have an easy answer. It is clear that there is a tyranny of the 
corporatist model based on data; however, the role of the state in nurturing the supremacy of 
data accumulation over the fundamental value of privacy is dubious at its best. By contrast, 
competition authorities have proceeded cautiously. In the assessment of privacy, care has been 
taken not to upset the balance of power and to overstep the traditional role of the competition 
authorities. The latter had not dealt with privacy before. At a first glance, privacy is an exotic fruit 
grown in the field of mergers. In reality, the terms and conditions of privacy are a mere sub-
division of a standard form agreement offered by online platforms to their users.  
To get back to basics, transactional contract theory is applicable in the sense that privacy terms 
and conditions might be unfairly imposed on users. Under the myriad of contract theories based 
on will, reliance, fairness, efficiency and good value, the consent theory of contract has replaced 
the traditional ones.163 Although the requirement of consent also implies transactional costs, the 
consent theory was better able to capture what the doctrine of consideration was unable to due 
to the lack of monetary consideration. A showing of consent is, therefore, prima facie sufficient 
to make an online platform’s user agreement legally enforceable. Furthermore, the consent 
theory recognises the need to enforce gratuitous commitments and, in this respect, the consent 
theory has sorted out the issue of the lack of monetary consideration of the many online services 
offered free-of-charge. The perils of the consent theory, as it is applicable to the context of online 
platforms, is that it protects a promisee’s reliance, i.e., online platform, on a promisor’s consent, 
i.e., online users, even in those instances where, for example, online users did not subjectively 
intend to be bound, e.g., for the lack of any reading or comprehension of privacy terms and 
conditions.164  
                                       
163 For an excellent narrative of the above contract theories, see, e.g., RE Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of 
Contract’, (1986) Colombia Law Review, 269-320, including (i) will theory dependent on the will of the 
parties, with moral implications and subjective intent; (ii) reliance on promises based on the intuition that 
we ought to be contractually liable; (iii) efficiency theory based on the maximisation of wealth; (iv) fairness 
theories based on substantive or procedural fairness; (v) bargain theory and, finally, (vi) consent theory. 
164 For the consent theory, see Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) Colombia Law Review, 320. 
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All in all, it has been shown above that the modern transactional theory of contract based on 
consent, although pragmatically helpful in many respects, as with many other theories applied in 
practice, is still a theory that is unable to resolve all problems. Put briefly, it is a theory that fails 
lamentably in practice. 
In Facebook/WhatsApp, there is also a welcome recognition of a number of important areas of 
improvement, in particular  
‘privacy and security, the importance of which varies from user to user but which are becoming 
increasingly valued, as shown by the introduction of consumer communications apps specifically 
addressing privacy and security issues’.165 
Privacy concerns have largely been dismissed based on the division of competence between 
competition and data protection law. For example, in Facebook/WhatsApp, it was stated that 
‘Any privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data within the 
control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU 
competition law rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules’.166  
A nearly identical statement was made in Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, specifically, that 
‘For the purposes of this decision, the Commission notes that any privacy-related concerns 
flowing from the use of data within the control of the Parties do not fall within the scope of the 
EU competition law rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules’.167 
Although sensible, at least one of the above statements was at odds with the fact that 
Facebook’s privacy policy had expressly stated that in the case of a change in ownership or 
control, users are subject to data transfer.168 However, in Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, the parties lacked 
the ability to lock-in patients by limiting or preventing the portability of their data.169 
A similar approach was, more recently, used in Microsoft/LinkedIn, specifically, that ‘the merger 
does not raise competition concerns resulting from the possible post-merger combination of the 
                                       
165 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 87. 
166 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 164. For the criticism that both the EU 
Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission have underestimated the ‘true’ value of data, see, e.g., 
A Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
Bloomsbury, 5th ed, 2016), p. 454. 
167 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 70. 
168 For Facebook’s privacy policy, see https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy?ref=new_policy. Currently, 
unlike Google, Facebook does not display its archived privacy policies. Similar provisions in the event of a 
merger were adopted by Whisper, see, e.g., AD Chirita, ‘The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy’, in M 
Bakhoum, B Gallego Conde, MO Mackenordt and G Surblyte (eds) Personal Data in Competition, Consumer 
Protection and IP Law – Towards a Holistic Approach? (Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, forthcoming 2018), p. 19. 
169 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 69; this is due to the new data protection 
regime. 
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data’, including more specifically, personal and behavioural data, and that ‘any such data 
combination (…) could only be implemented by the merged entity to the extent it is allowed by 
applicable data protection law’.170  
The merging parties had made it clear that they did not make data available to third-parties for 
the purpose of advertising subject to ‘very limited exceptions’.171 
In the early years of consideration of data-driven mergers in Google/Double Click, the decision 
simply paid attention to the legal framework, mentioning that it is ‘without prejudice’ to Directive 
95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC.172 This conveyed an impression that there was no appetite for 
any review of data and privacy implications. It, nonetheless, highlighted the need for greater 
coordination between competition and data protection. 
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, privacy considerations were effectively ignored with the justification that 
the merger   
‘does not raise competition concerns resulting from the possible post-merger combination of 
data (essentially consisting of personal information, such as information about an individual’s job, 
career history and professional connections, and/or her or his email or other contacts, search 
behaviour etc. about the users of their services) held by each of the Parties in relation to online 
advertising’.173 
The problem associated with this approach overlooking privacy is that the Commission too 
readily accepted that such a data combination is already compliant with data protection law. 
Instead, it examined horizontal effects since actual or potential competitors will need to collect 
‘even more data to compete effectively with the new entity’.174 Both merging parties were 
believed not to compete against each other in advertising on the basis of data and not to make 
data available to third parties for advertising but for ‘very limited exceptions’.175  
Nonetheless, too much faith was placed in the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679),176 
one year ahead of its entry into force. Indeed, the new regime might not be as effective in 
addressing the existing loopholes regarding data. In particular, the decision noted that the new 
                                       
170 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 176 and 177. 
171 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 180. 
172 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 368. 
173 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 176. 
174 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 179. 
175 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 180. Microsoft submitted that it did not hold ‘a 
significant percentage of valuable data for advertising purposes’. 
176 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the EU Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
OJ L 119/2016. 
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regulation could limit Microsoft’s ability to have access to LinkedIn’s full data and process 
personal data, ‘thereby strengthening the existing rights and empowering individuals with more 
control over personal data’.177 This remains rather wishful thinking since Microsoft’s strategic 
move was simply the acquisition of ‘more data’.  
As has previously been noted with regard to the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, the data protection 
regulation is not empowered to block mergers and acquisitions. Competition authorities are 
therefore best placed to consider the implications of a large accumulation of data and to review 
unfair terms and conditions of privacy. Furthermore, the dismissal of privacy considerations on 
grounds based largely on the classical divide between competition and data protection is 
unhelpful in instrumenting the case against behavioural price discrimination, which is something 
that privacy cannot deal with. As one commentator explained, first-degree price discrimination is 
one manifestation of the significant privacy and autonomy risks, ‘But privacy may not be the right 
tool to address the problem’.178 
Finally, regarding the new data protection regime and the question of whether it is, indeed, 
offering better protection against data breaches, the answer is that one can only hope so. Again, 
it is rather wishful thinking that we expect data protection authorities to take action against the 
exploitation of aggregated and anonymised behavioural data that could negatively affect the 
economic interests of consumers. Recital 75 of the new Data Protection Regulation 679/2016 
refers to discrimination and to any other significant economic disadvantage, to personal 
economic situation, personal preferences or interests, behaviour, location or movements, all of 
which depict the landscape of data analytics analysed above in the context of mergers. Article 3 
(1) of the Directive 680/2016 recognises name, identification number, location, online identifier 
and economic identity as personal data. In other words, the legal framework recognises 
individual rights to an online personal identity; thus, in the wake of the market studies and 
research involving aggregated personal identities, the enforcement of individual rights to an 
online personal identity relies on the legal tests foreseen by the data protection law. It will, 
however, be argued that the enforcement of individual rights to online economic identity, 
envisioning the economic rights referred to above, could solely be enforced by competition 
authorities. We cannot, and should not, accept that data and privacy experts deal with cases of 
online price discrimination. 
                                       
177 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 178 and 368 respectively. 
178 See, e.g., CJ Hoofnagle, Federal Trade Commission Privacy Law and Policy, chapter 6 on ‘Online privacy’ 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 147. Hoofnagle also refers to another paradox, namely, 
the inconsistency between consumer desires for more privacy and their actual behaviour of exposing an 
excessive wealth of personal information on social platforms. 
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VI. Towards a Workable Theory of Harm? 
Several attempts have already been made to address the nefarious effects of the accumulation 
of data by advancing theories of harm to consumers. None of these so-called ‘theories’ was 
ultimately a workable theory that could be applicable to all data-driven mergers in recent 
practice. This sub-section will map the most relevant theories of harm and, based on their 
criticism, offer a workable theory of harm. 
(i) Consumer Harm Due to Degradation of Quality and Targeted Advertising 
Both Facebook/WhatsApp and Yahoo/Search offer a different kind of theory of harm, which is 
discussed as a ‘theoretical’ possibility, leading to a bifurcated analysis of ‘targeted advertising’ 
and ‘degradation’, i.e., diminution, of quality.179 The catalyst for this bifurcated theory is the 
consumer-protection function inherent in competition law,180 as the primary focus of consumer 
law is on advertising and quality. In recent years, most notably after the enactment of the 
Guidance Paper on the prioritisation of cases under Article 102 TFEU, there has been an extension 
of the consumer-protection function with a further welcome focus on consumer choice and 
implications for innovation. As the areas of abuse of dominance and mergers are intertwined, this 
extension of enforcement is helpful and pragmatic. More specifically, the legal test applicable to 
mergers is focused on the ‘creation or strengthening’ of a dominant position following the 
merger. Disregarding such consumer considerations could therefore lead to an enforcement 
gap;181 consumer law is not equipped to deal either with monopolistic power or with mergers. 
In the first scenario in Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission examined the theoretical possibility 
of introducing targeted advertising following a change in WhatsApp’s privacy policy and data 
collection for the same purpose of targeted advertising.182 These scenarios were dismissed due to 
                                       
179 COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014; COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 
February 2010. 
180 See, e.g., R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2015), p. 20, 
favouring a consumer-protection function applicable, more generally, to competition law; in the area of 
mergers, see, the reference to the reduction of quality in the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of mergers between undertakings, OJ [2004] C 31/5, 
para 36 on decreasing quality; para 65 on deteriorating quality; and specifically for the prohibition of abuse 
of a dominant position, see, e.g., AD Chirita, ‘Undistorted, (Un)fair Competition, Consumer Welfare and the 
Interpretation of Article 102 TFEU’, (2010) World Competition Law and Economics Review 3 (33), p. 417-436. 
In the context of free goods, as more emphasis has to be placed on quality, rather than on price, this could 
therefore enforce a consumer-protection function of competition law, see, e.g., M Gal and D Rubinfeld, 
‘The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement’, (2016) Antitrust Law Journal (80) 
3, 542. 
181 In the same vein, see, e.g., M Gal and D Rubinfeld, ‘The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for 
Antitrust Enforcement’, (2016) Antitrust Law Journal (80) 3, 546, at footnote 143 on Facebook’s privacy 
cases, highlighting that, due to the absence of monetary consideration, some courts decided that 
consumer law does not apply. 
182 See COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 173 and 185 and para 180 respectively. 
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the possibility of switching from Facebook and WhatsApp to other services and the existence of 
alternative providers of data for the purpose of advertising, e.g., Apple, Amazon, eBay, 
Microsoft, AOL, Twitter, Yahoo!, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe and Yelp.183 
In the second scenario, in Yahoo/Search, the Commission examined the theoretical possibility of 
degradation of the organic search due to the trade off from paid results. This possibility was 
easily dismissed because ‘when a platform tries to attract more users through greater relevance 
on the organic search it runs the risk of losing revenues on the advertising side’.184  As adCenter 
and Bing will process more traffic, more data will then be available for experimentation which, in 
turn, will also ‘tend to increase’ the quality of the new product through better ad matching and 
higher conversion rates of sale. It was firmly believed that the new platform would eventually 
become an effective competitor of Google.185 In Google/Double Click, there was also consideration 
of the same possibility of the degradation of Double Click tool’s quality, including bundling 
Double Click with Google’s intermediation services.186 
In Publicis/Omnicom, the Commission also examined whether big data may facilitate online 
targeted advertising and become crucial to conducting a business and to attracting new 
advertisers.187 By contrast, in TomTom/TeleAtlas, the Commission found that the merged entity 
was most likely to have the ability to increase prices, degrade quality or delay access for some 
manufacturers and navigation software providers of digital maps.188 However, confidentiality 
concerns were considered similar to product degradation in that the perceived value of the 
navigable digital map for manufacturers would be lower if the latter feared that confidential 
information would be shared with TomTom.189 These concerns were later dismissed due to the 
limited amount of information of competitive value exchanged between Tele Atlas and its 
customers.190 
Given the dismissal of the above counterfactual scenarios, one could extract as a preliminary 
conclusion that the consumer harm caused in these cases by an accumulation of data was not 
taken too seriously. The most plausible explanation is that both the degradation of quality and 
targeted advertising are primarily the mission of consumer laws. In contrast, the mission of 
competition law in the area of mergers is to balance the existence of conglomerate effects. Both 
                                       
183 COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 188. 
184 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 204. 
185 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 192. 
186 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 289. 
187 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 625. 
188 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/TeleAtlas, 14 May 2008, para 210. 
189 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 274. 
190 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 276. 
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Microsoft/Yahoo Search and Microsoft/Skype evaluated these effects but, nonetheless, dismissed 
them.191  
(ii) Consumer Harm Due to Horizontal Effects 
In Microsoft/Skype, consideration was given to the horizontal effects on consumer 
communications including instant messaging, voice and video calls on PCs having Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system, and on enterprise communications.192 None of these effects were 
considered to be significant. In Facebook/WhatsApp, the horizontal effects were dismissed since 
only Facebook is active in the provision of online advertising services.193 In 
Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere/JV, the Commission examined whether the merger 
could give rise to horizontal effects, but concluded that JV could face competition from a number 
of market participants, including Google and Apple.194 Given the low market shares and the 
presence of several strong competitors, no horizontal effects were identifiable in IMS 
Health/Cegedim Business with regard to intelligent business solutions; nonetheless, such effects 
were identified with regard to the provision of syndicated primary market research.195 
(iii) Consumer Harm Due to Conglomerate Effects through Tying or Bundling 
In Microsoft/Yahoo Search, it was found that the existence of conglomerate effects may increase 
Microsoft’s ability to leverage its market power in areas other than online advertising including 
notably its PC operating systems and personal productivity apps.196 In particular, Microsoft could 
negotiate distribution agreements with manufacturers for the default making of its search 
technology. The consumer harm inflicted through such bundling was rather surprisingly 
considered ‘unlikely to be significant’.197 In Microsoft/Skype, similar conglomerate effects were 
identified due to Microsoft’s dominant position in the market for Windows operating systems, 
the Internet Explorer browser and Office apps software.198 In particular, Microsoft could degrade 
the interoperability of Skype with competing operating systems and platforms and instead 
interoperate solely with Microsoft’s Lync app.199 Furthermore, Microsoft could technologically 
                                       
191 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, paras 244; COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 
October 2011, paras 158 and 214. 
192 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011; on appeal, see Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v 
Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635. 
193 COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, para 165. 
194 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 523 to 
528. 
195 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, paras 166 and 189 respectively. 
196 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, paras 243. 
197 COMP M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, paras 244. 
198 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para 133. 
199 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, paras 135 and 213. 
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integrate Skype and Windows as a ‘must-have’ product or engage in commercial bundling of 
Skype with Microsoft’s Windows operating system or Office app.200 On appeal, the Commission 
was criticised for not having considered such conglomerate effects, in particular ‘the ability of 
and the incentives for the new entity to use its position on the consumer communications market 
as leverage to distort competition on the enterprise communications market’.201 However, the 
General Court found that the theory of harm based on conglomerate effects was ‘complex and 
abstract’ based on a generic assumption that ‘concentrations giving rise to conglomerates do not 
usually generate competition concerns’.202 Conglomerate effects were also dismissed in 
Publicis/Omnicom because the parties would not have the ability or incentive to leverage a 
position on one market to another by means of tying or bundling or other exclusionary 
practices.203 In Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere/JV, the Commission considered any 
conglomerate effects stemming from the combination of products in related markets which may 
facilitate the ability and incentive of the merging parties to leverage a strong market position 
from one market to another through tying or bundling; thus, no concerns were identified.204  
In Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, the Commission also looked at the potential for conglomerate effects.205 
It examined the ability to foreclose rivals through tying, bundling or limiting the interoperability 
with competing providers.206 The Commission found that neither JV, nor the parties had a market 
position which could be leveraged to exclude third-party device manufacturers, insulin providers 
or providers of digital services for the management and treatment of diabetes. The parties also 
lack such an incentive; otherwise, by preventing third-parties’ insulins and devices from working, 
JV would drive patients away.207 No conglomerate effects were found in IMS Health/Cegedim 
Business.208  
(iv) Consumer Harm due to Exclusionary Effects of Data Combination 
In Facebook/WhatsApp and Google/Double Click, the overarching theory of consumer harm is 
based on the exclusionary effects of data combination. Again, the existing concerns were too 
                                       
200 COMP M. 6281, Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, paras 137 and 138. 
201 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 107. 
202 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, Case T-79/12, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635, para 112; 
subsequently, the Court rejected the theory of harm based on conglomerate effects as purely speculative, 
at para 121. 
203 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 673. However, one competitor submitted to the 
market investigation that the merged entity will be able to leverage its market power in price negotiations 
with media vendors, which will lead to higher barriers to market entry, see, para 679; this was 
counterbalanced by the broad choice of alternative agencies and the buyer power of media vendors. 
204 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 518-522. 
205 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 85; thus, this was not the case. 
206 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 84. 
207 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, para 84. 
208 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 275. 
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easily dismissed, often with not too plausible explanations. For example, in Facebook/WhatsApp, 
it was simply mentioned that ‘there will continue to be a large amount of Internet user data that 
are valuable for advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook’s exclusive control’ and 
that ‘there are currently a significant number of market participants that collect user data 
alongside Facebook’.209 Although this was an easy way of dismissing any exclusionary effects on 
competing rivals, this statement did not helpfully consider how the data combination could 
subsequently exploit consumers. A similar approach to foreclosure effects was applied to 
Google/Double Click. It highlighted that the data collected by Double Click was ‘relatively narrow 
in scope’ and that ‘other companies active in online advertising have the ability to collect large 
amounts of more or less similar information that is potentially useful for’ targeted advertising, 
e.g., Yahoo!’s Blue Lithium collection of behavioural data.210 All in all, neither the merged entity, 
nor Double Click alone could access ‘unique, non-replicable data’.211 Indeed, the merged entity 
would need to renegotiate contractual terms.212 This was the theory of harm underpinning the 
combination of data. Although targeted advertising was a cause for concern, the available 
technology to implement it was still at an early stage: 
‘the type of behavioural targeting that lies at the core of these network effects is an emerging 
technology which neither Double Click nor Google have developed vis-à-vis Yahoo!, Blue Lithium 
or AOL’s Tacoda’.213 
Publicis/Omnicom underwent a similar assessment where it was noted that the large majority of 
competing rivals are ‘at least similarly placed to the merged entity to get access to big data 
analytics’.214 Again, the focus was exclusionary, which examined whether competing advertising 
agencies would continue to have access following the merger. Competitors offered mixed 
responses: some were still relying on the offline world, whilst others noted the increasing 
importance of big data.215 They confirmed, however, that there would be access to a large 
number of third-party providers of big data analytics and that some of them had already 
developed their own data analytics tools.216 But none of the rival media owners believed 
                                       
209 See COMP/M. 7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, paras 189 and 188 respectively. 
210 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, paras 269 and 270. 
211 One could add here the explanation that data is ‘non-rivalrous’ in the sense that its collection cannot 
prevent others from collecting identical data, see, e.g., D Rubinfeld & M Gal, ‘Access Barriers to Big Data’, 
(2017) Arizona Law Review 59, 339, p. 369. 
212 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 303. 
213 COMP M. 4731, Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, para 303. 
214 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 628. 
215 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 626. 
216 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 627. See also para 628, where one competitor 
emphasized that third-party providers of data such as Twitter, Facebook, Google and blogs offer 
aggregated data free of charge or for a fee. 
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Publicis/Omnicom to be ‘better placed than its competitors post-merger to get access to big data 
analytics’.217 Even if the merged entity were to block access to Publicis/Omnicom’s own data 
analytics platform, the impact would still be rather limited, as ‘many other providers are 
developing big data platforms, or will be able to access similar data and not be disadvantaged’.218 
Based on this survey, the Commission concluded that there are no serious doubts with regard to 
big data since a sufficient number of alternative providers of big data analytics will still be 
available.219 However, a number of manufacturers of portable navigable devices were concerned 
that the merged entity would increase map database prices, offer lower quality or delay the 
availability of new features and updates.220  
By contrast, in TomTom/Tele Atlas, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that, although the 
merged entity had the ability to foreclose, it would simply lack any incentive to do so.221 Any price 
increase in the downstream market would not be profitable for the merged entity. More 
important, however, was that the merged entity would gain access to commercially sensitive 
information regarding the downstream activity of rivals.222 This would allow it to compete less 
aggressively or make entry and expansion less attractive for competitors. Due to vertical 
integration, confidential information could be shared with TomTom.223 In this respect, the 
Commission considered it unlikely that such confidentiality issues could lead to a significant 
impediment to effective competition in the market for navigable digital map databases and that 
the merged entity would still have the incentive to protect its customers’ confidential 
information.224 
                                       
217 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 628. 
218 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 629; a small minority of respondents noted, 
however, that the impact on them will be negative. 
219 COMP M. 7023, Publicis/Omnicom, 9 January 2014, para 630. See, para 660, where the Commission 
arrives at the conclusion that it is ‘unlikely that the merged entity will have the ability and the incentive to 
restrict the access to the advertising space to competitors of the merged entity’s media buying agencies or 
to discriminate against these competitors’. Furthermore, the sale of advertising space in cinema is not an 
important product for the downstream market, see para 665; hence, any input foreclosure will not be 
profitable, see, paras 664 and 669. 
220 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 190. Elsewhere, see, para 198, the merging parties 
argued that quality degradation or delayed release of updates would be impossible because Tele Atlas 
offers only one core digital navigable map database for any given geographical area. Furthermore, quality 
degradation would be technically difficult, see, para 199. 
221 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 230. Earlier, see, para 210, it was, however, 
acknowledged that the merged entity is likely to have the ability to increase prices or degrade quality or 
delay access for some manufacturers and navigation software providers competing with TomTom; thus, 
quality degradation would be unprofitable, see, para 220. 
222 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 252, with further reference to para 78 of the 
Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 265/07 [2008]. 
223 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, para 253. 
224 COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas, 14 May 2008, paras 254 and 255 respectively. 
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In Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere/JV,  the Commission considered the likelihood of a 
strategy to technically or commercially foreclose access to essential inputs for the provision of 
mobile wallet products offered to final consumers.225 This was found not to be the case, as there 
are a considerable number of alternative banks.226 In reaching its view, the Commission 
subsequently noted that the market concerned is a ‘nascent and evolving’ one and that there will 
be additional competition coming from future new technologies based on software, cloud-based 
SEs, micro-SD, NFC stickers and sleeves.227 It questioned whether the merging parties would 
indeed have the technical ability to substantially foreclose access to SIM-based SEs to competing 
mobile wallet providers, including the ability to degrade competing mobile wallets functioning 
with an alternative SE.228 Due to the availability of dual architecture smartphones, competitors 
could offer their products using embedded SEs, including stickers for maximising consumer 
reach.229 Relying on Ofcom’s technical expertise, the Commission examined whether the merging 
parties had a technical ability to foreclose competing mobile wallet providers, including 
preventing the downloading of a competing mobile wallet app without blocking access to the 
entire app store.230 Following an in-depth technical analysis, it was felt that the blocking of the 
entire traffic from a given IP address ‘would not make economic sense’ for the merging parties 
and would be detected by consumers.231 It was therefore concluded that the parties would have 
no ability either to technically block or to degrade a competing mobile wallet app from being 
downloaded, installed or updated on a handset operating on the network of the parties, 
including the automatic setting of preferences to SIM-based SE or further delisting of mobile 
datasets capable of supporting rival mobile wallets.232 
In Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, with regard to data analytics services in the field of healthcare, the 
Commission did not identify any risk of market foreclosure; there were alternative providers, 
including one competitor offering data analytics tools in-house.233 In IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 
the Commission found that IMS does not have the ability or the incentive to successfully 
                                       
225 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 248. 
226 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 249. 
227 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 259. 
228 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 263. 
229 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, para 268. 
230 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 294, 295 
to 306. 
231 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 307 and 
308. For adverse consumer reactions, see, para 435. 
232 COMP/M. 6314, Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 4 September 2012, paras 307, 313 
and 347 respectively. The same is valid even after the installation of an embedded SE, see, para 322; see 
subsequently, paras 450 and 491. 
233 COMP/M. 7813, Sanofi/Google/DMI JV, 23 February 2016, paras 72 and 76. 
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foreclose access to experience and clinical trials data.234 A majority of competitors submitted to 
the Commission that it was difficult to collect such data from multiple sources, which also 
involves a considerable cost.235 Thus, the transaction did not raise vertical effects.236 There are 
alternative suppliers of healthcare professional databases, including aPureBase and Veeva.237 The 
Commission identified vertical foreclosure effects with regard to healthcare professional 
databases and sales tracking data. It reached the conclusion that IMS will effectively have the 
ability to foreclose access to its brick structure to competing providers of such databases or 
make access more onerous for customers.238 IMS will be the owner of a stronger offer in the 
customer interaction software. 
In Microsoft/LinkedIn, the Commission tipped the balance in favour of pro-competitive benefits 
following two counter-factual merger scenarios, specifically, assuming that LinkedIn had no 
incentive to monetise its data on a stand-alone basis and that Microsoft would have access to 
LinkedIn’s data and use it to improve its software solutions. Then, the merger may have pro-
competitive effects, i.e., new products or improvements to existing ones to the benefit of 
consumers ‘based on a dataset to which otherwise no one would have access’.239 The 
Commission’s optimism was fuelled by uncertainty over whether LinkedIn’s Sales Navigator could 
become an important input.240 Therefore, no foreclosure of competing providers of alternative 
software solutions was foreseeable.241 As Intel explained, although LinkedIn’s data is ‘very 
useful’, it is not the only source of data. There are many other sources available of ‘unstructured 
information about commercial markets and cognitive solutions’.242 The majority of competing 
intelligent solutions providers submitted that the impact on effective competition of the 
proposed merger would be negative.243 In contrast, the Commission considered it unlikely that 
                                       
234 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, paras 211 and 213. 
235 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 214. 
236 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 217. 
237 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, para 229. 
238 COMP/M. 7337, IMS Health/Cegedim Business, 19 December 2014, paras 242, 244, 254 and 257. 
239 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 249. In the absence of the present merger 
scenario, LinkedIn did not plan licensing its data to any third-parties, see, para 376. 
240 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 250. LinkedIn Sales Navigator’s competitors 
and half of its customers submitted that LinkedIn’s solution is, or will become, an important input, see, 
para 257. In contrast, the Commission suggested that all major vendors have already started offering 
advance functionalities, including SalesForce, Zoho and E-Deal. 
241 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 253 and 267. Due to LinkedIn’s insignificant 
market share, the merged entity would not have the ability to foreclose competing providers of software 
solutions, see, para 373. 
242 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 263. 
243 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 273. 
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the overall impact would be negative and unlikely to lead to consumer harm.244 Even if Microsoft 
were to use LinkedIn’s data, this is unlikely to affect a significant number of Microsoft’s 
competitors through a significant price increase or a reduction in the incentives to innovate.245 
The underpinning philosophy of this final assessment is recognition that, although ‘data is a 
relevant input’, it is not an ‘essential’ one.246 
Referring to the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger where the quest was ‘whether bringing the 
companies’ data together would make it too hard for others to compete’, the Commissioner for 
Competition suggested that ‘controlling a large amount of data shouldn’t become a way to shut 
rivals out of the market’.247 However, ‘this wasn’t an issue (…) as other companies still had access 
to plenty of data’.  
On the basis of all the above merger decisions, a preliminary conclusion would suggest that the 
exclusionary focus based on the question of whether rivals have access to even more data is 
unhelpful if it does not address the harm caused to consumers through the exploitative use of 
data. It is furthermore submitted that an exclusive reliance on the market foreclosure test is not 
in the spirit of consumer and data protection laws. 
VII. Merger Control in the Public Interest: Are Privacy Considerations Taken Seriously in Data-
Driven Mergers? 
One could come to regret after having accepted the terms and conditions of privacy imposed by 
various online platforms, including software companies, not because one could not be bothered 
to read them, but because one did not have the time. However, many people, who might have 
taken the time to read them, may have not properly understood all the privacy implications. 
After having read and reviewed the most relevant data-driven mergers, one could say that 
significant resources have been spent on understanding and explaining the intricacies of data 
analytics and the potential harm to consumers through the prism of the traditional economic 
analysis of horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects. In 2008, it was not very clear whether 
competition authorities were well-equipped to deal with data; after 2016, it become clear that the 
learning curve has made it possible to examine data analytics in more depth than before. One 
could, nonetheless, argue that privacy considerations of an economic nature could be taken into 
account even more seriously than before. The assessment of mergers has been based more on 
                                       
244 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, paras 274 and 275 respectively as well as para 380. 
The majority of the respondents expected the effects of this merger to be neutral; see, para 378. 
245 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 275. 
246 COMP M. 8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, 20 January 2017, para 276. 
247 See EU Commission, Commissioner for Competition, M Vestager, Speech: Clearing the path for 
innovation, Lisbon, 7 November 2017, p.4. 
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economic considerations rather than on any legal interpretation. It could, otherwise, be argued 
that the analysis of the expected merger-specific efficiencies brought about by the proposed 
merger could be endangered by unwanted political attention and hidden considerations. 
However, economics can no longer ignore a wider social context that requires a careful balancing 
of privacy considerations which bear economic weight.  
One commentator has already rejected the consideration of privacy as being in breach of the EU 
Merger Regulation.248 Based on a literal interpretation of the Regulation, privacy consideration 
might not be a good fit. However, there are wider public policy considerations than a narrower 
focus on privacy. The legal instrument is Article 21 (4) of the EU Merger Control Regulation 
139/2004, which allows Member States to ‘take appropriate measures to protect legitimate 
interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the 
general principles and other provisions of Community law’.  
Under the Merger Control Regulation, the protection of privacy could be seen to fall under the 
remit of other ‘legitimate interests’, being a concrete matter of public interest. One potential 
obstacle against this projection is the wording of the second sentence of Article 21 (4), which, 
under the concept of a ‘recognised public interest’, includes more specifically ‘public security, 
plurality of the media and prudential rules’. This shortcoming could easily be overcome by 
reliance on the last paragraph of Article 21 (4), which mandates that ‘any other public interest’ be 
communicated to the Commission for an evaluation on a case-by-case basis,249 and so it could 
successfully include privacy considerations as a sub-type of terms and conditions of use for online 
platforms. Although ‘other legitimate public interest’ grounds have, only very rarely, been 
invoked,250 high-tech could be recognised as a strategic sector, as certain corporations have 
become influential tools of the unprecedented mass surveillance of individuals. On balance, there 
is a greater public interest in cushioning individuals against the pervasive powers of self-
interested multinational corporations. 
The blocking of a merger on grounds of public interest remains a solution of last resort; it would 
attract unwanted criticism for being based on politics, rather than on economic considerations.251 
                                       
248 See, e.g., B Holles de Peyer, ‘EU Merger Control and Big Data’, (2017) Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics (4) 13, p. 767 and ff. 
249 On the distinction between recognised and non-recognised interests, see, e.g., C Bengtsson, JM Carpi 
Badia and M Kadar, ‘Mergers’ in J Faull and A Nikpay (eds) The EU Law of Competition (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed., 2014)  p. 607, paras 5.283 and 5.284. 
250 For this view, see, e.g., Bellamy & Child, European Union Law of Competition V Rose and D Bailey (eds) 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2013) p. 568 and 569, para 8.104 
251 For a number of politically controversial merger decisions, see, O Koch, ‘Fundamentals of European 
Merger Control’ in G Hirsch, F Montag and FJ Säcker (eds) Competition Law: European Community Practice 
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It is, however, obvious that the motives for the market study of data analysis are for profit-
seeking. As has already been recognised elsewhere, merger decisions are often economic and/or 
political decisions.252 In the merger enforcement of the last decade, one could see this from the 
alternative perspective: merger decisions are in essence economic decisions, and only 
exceptionally based on legal interpretation. Ultimately, the politics of privacy will triumph, 
hopefully for those people who take the time to read privacy policies but have no choice but to 
leave an online platform. 
VIII. Conclusion 
From the Google/Double Click merger in 2008 up to Microsoft/LinkedIn in 2016, the assessment of 
data and privacy considerations in mergers slightly improved and hopefully will continue to do so. 
Overall, the acquisition of large data sets has represented an intelligent and strategic move 
towards harvesting even more useful data. The focus has been on the exclusionary likelihood of 
competition on the basis of data rather than on the exploitative likelihood and actual harm 
caused to consumers following the use of data.  
One enforcement weakness has been the unconditional approval of several data-driven mergers. 
Another enforcement weakness has been the belief that data and consumer protection laws are 
capable of calibrating the imbalance caused by aggressive competition on the basis of data. 
Nowadays, data has been recognised as a competitive indicator of performance. In transactional 
theory, the performance indicator has traditionally been the price or the monetary consideration. 
In online platforms, exchanges have therefore substituted the price with data. However, users of 
online platforms possess weaker bargaining power; they have no choice but to consent to 
default terms and conditions and give in to notices of privacy changes. These developments are 
nefarious and should have been approached differently by the competition authorities. 
First, reliance on consumer law is a fallacy, as, although the latter deals with misleading and 
comparative advertising, competition law could also activate its consumer-protection function to 
address targeted advertising and the degradation of quality in the context of online platforms. 
Second, reliance on data protection is another fallacy, as the former cannot block mergers or 
acquisitions. Furthermore, a data protection compliance checklist may confirm that online 
platforms indeed attempt to be fully compliant with data protection, e.g., (i) platform users have 
freely given their consent, even if they had decided not to read lengthy privacy conditions or a 
platform’s terms of use; and (ii) their aggregated data was anonymised and then shared or 
                                                                                                                       
and Procedure (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), p. 1918-1919, paras 5-1-073 to 5-1-077, and footnotes 210 to 
213. 
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transferred. Third, reliance on the market-foreclosure test as a panacea for competition based on 
data with a comprehensive but conservative evaluation of access to data and barriers to market 
entry, often serves mostly competing rivals who need access to the data in question.  Without an 
extension of the test of foreclosure to the analysis of consumer harm from exploitation, there is 
a risk of under-enforcement.  
The vast majority of data-driven mergers have given rise to horizontal effects, e.g., Google/Double 
Click, Facebook/WhatsApp, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, Microsoft/Skype, Publicis/Omnicom, Cisco & 
Messagenet, rather than vertical effects, e.g., TomTom/Tele Atlas. Based on the horizontal and 
vertical dichotomy, only a tiny minority, e.g., Microsoft/Skype and Cisco & Messagenet, have given 
rise to conglomerate effects. Nurturing conglomerates in the long run is therefore no longer 
remotely possible. Too much faith in ephemeral high market shares and a reduction in innovation 
is also dangerous. In the end, conglomerates become largely bureaucratic, i.e., inefficient, which 
can only inhibit entrepreneurship and innovation. 
How could these concerns be addressed? There is a clear need for better coordination of the 
enforcement efforts with regard to digital platforms. Institutional cooperation may also help 
better inform about the wider scope of competition, consumer and data protection laws. It could 
address enforcement gaps and empower one authority for areas that cannot be dealt with by the 
others, especially when dealing with monopolies or mergers. Ultimately, existing tests have to be 
adapted to the requirements and particularities of digital markets. 
No doubt, some of the competition concerns have already been addressed through specific 
remedies. Some remedies have inter alia ensured that manufacturers or distributors of PCs do 
not pre-install LinkedIn on the Windows operating system, that LinkedIn can be removed if pre-
installed, and that the interoperability of competing service providers with Windows’ office apps 
is duly maintained. 
